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Abstract
The aim of many experiments is to estimate the effect of different inter-
ventions on subjects’ decision making. However, obtaining large samples
and internal validity is challenging. This paper presents an alternative
device at almost no cost that can easily provide a very large number
of participants (700 in 5 hours). We asked 14 students to invite their
WhatsApp contacts to participate in an online experiment. The students
created a total of 80 diffusion groups with 25 contacts each. Using the
diffusion groups as clusters, we ran a cluster randomization procedure in
order to assign subjects to a framing experiment (treatment + control).
We obtained the same level of attrition, duplicates and uninvited sub-
jects across the treatment and control groups. Moreover, the experiment
yielded consistent results in line with the framing literature.
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1 Introduction
The cornerstone of most experiments in social sciences is the random assign-
ment of subjects to different treatments. Depending on the size effect and the
number of treatments, it is not only necessary to recruit a sufficiently large
number of subjects to detect a moderate minimum detectable effect, but also to
obtain comparable groups after the randomization process (balance). Inviting
a sufficiently large number of subjects to participate - the recruiting process -
is time consuming and costly.
Although experiments were initially conducted with paper and pencil, re-
searchers have now developed tools to perform experiments over local com-
puter networks where subjects receive instructions and make their decisions in
a computer-based environment (Fischbacher, 2007). Using these tools, experi-
menters also gain control over the flow of information and thereby reduce po-
tential confounding factors (Horton et al., 2011). To conduct lab experiments,
however, subjects are typically brought into physical laboratories despite the
fact that many of these experiments can be conducted remotely (online).
Online participation in experiments has several advantages. Firstly, costs
can be notably reduced since experimental subjects do not need to be paid
travel expenses. Participants also have more freedom to choose a schedule that
best suits them.1 Additionally, online samples allow for larger and longer studies
with potentially more diverse subjects (Horton et al., 2011). This is important
because larger samples are critical to have sufficient statistical power to measure
treatment effects. Recently, online labor markets such as Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) or Prolific Economics enable researchers to recruit a sufficiently
large number of subjects and randomly assign participants to different treat-
ments. These platforms connect researchers to experimental subjects, who are
paid to complete the tasks on the computer (Rand, 2012).
In this paper, we present an alternative and practically cost-free device that
can be used to recruit a huge number of participants and provide a larger number
1In the case of simultaneous games, coordination between participants is necessary.
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of responses (1000 in 5 hours). To do so, we asked 14 students to divide their
WhatsApp contacts into different diffusion groups with 25 members each and
subsequently invite their contacts to participate in an online experiment.
To ensure a perfect randomization, we assigned 80 diffusion groups to the
treatment and the control following a cluster randomization procedure. A total
of 1979 messages were sent to the subjects, 1005 to the control group and 974
to the treatment group. Only 37% of the invited subjects participated. The
final sample comprised a total of 737 subjects and was divided in the following
way: 387 in the treatment and 350 in the control group. The attrition level
was similar in both groups (64% in the control group and 61% in the treatment
group). Both samples were similar in terms of their observable characteristics.
On average, each student sent 141 invitations which produced 53 responses
(37%).
Our procedure to recruit subjects achieved four major goals in terms of inter-
nal validity. First, we obtained two comparable groups with different observable
characteristics. Second, our procedure led to the same level of attrition and the
same percentage of duplicates (subjects who performed the experiment more
than once). Third, our procedure allowed us to recruit subjects who were not
invited to participate in the experiment. These subjects were evenly distributed
across the groups and did not affect the between-group comparability. Lastly,
our procedure allowed us to recruit nearly 800 subjects in less than 12 hours.
This is a very fast procedure that reduces the probability of subjects interacting
with each other and thus contaminating the results.
To check the external validity of the procedure, we ran a framed Prisoner’s
Dilemma experiment. Our results are in line with the framing literature on the
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG).
Overall, the results presented in this paper suggest that our procedure
worked properly. A device like this is of particular interest for researchers with
limited funding and who do not have access to proper labs and funding.
The paper is structured as follows. The recruitment and randomization
procedure is presented in Section 2 and the framed PDG experiment is presented
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in Section 3. The results of the randomization and the degree of comparability
of the treatment and control groups are discussed in Section 4.The presence of
different threats to the internal validity are analyzed in Section 5. The results
of the experiment are discussed in Section 6 in line with the framing literature.
Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Recruiting procedure
The goal of experimental research is to estimate whether subjects are sensitive
to treatments. To obtain good estimators of these effects it is necessary to de-
sign a procedure that allows collecting sufficiently large samples. Additionally,
subjects should be assigned to treatments that guarantee orthogonality with
potential confounders. Sufficiently large samples ensure that enough statistical
power is available to find moderate treatment effects, while orthogonality en-
sures internal validity. In this section we present the randomization procedure
in order to solve both problems at once.
In order to reach a large number of subjects, we asked students to invite their
WhatsApp contacts to participate in an online experiment. Subjects under the
age of 16 were not allowed to participate.2 Because assigning each WhatsApp
contact to the treatment might be time consuming and, more importantly, be
subject to human error due to inattention, we used a cluster randomization
design.
We asked the students to generate different diffusion groups (with k=25)
following the alphabetical order of their contacts. Alphabetical ordering (as a
quasi-natural or natural experiment) might be a reasonable solution when indi-
vidual randomization is impossible. Indeed, there is evidence in the literature
that alphabetical ordering is adequate.3.
2Participants aged 16 and 17 years old (a total of 16 in our sample) can give their consent
without the need for parental authorization (Article 8 and Recitals 38 and 58 of Directive
95/46/EC).
3In Miguel and Kremer (2004), school children were assigned to a deworming treatment
by alphabetical order. This was also the case of the experiment of Glewwe et al. (2004) who
used flip charts in schools. Both papers found that the control and treatment groups were
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Figure 1: Randomization process
Each of the students created four diffusion groups: D1, D2, D3 and D4.
Each of them then assigned their first 25 contacts to D1, the next 25 contacts
to D2, and so on. After contact 100 they repeated the process again: 101-125
to D1, 126-150 to D2, and so on. The procedure is represented graphically in
Panel A of Figure 1. As can be observed, each diffusion group is represented by
a cluster. It is important to note that the cut-off of 25 contacts was selected by
the researchers (and not by the students) and was independent of each student’s
number of contacts. All the students were asked to report the number of contacts
as well as the number of diffusion groups they had created.
The students were then provided an assignation rule (where C refers to the
control group and T to the treatment group): CCTT, TTCC, CTCT or TCTC.
The students who received CTCT sent invitations to all the contacts included in
D1 and D3 to participate in the control, as well as invitations to the members of
balanced before the interventions. Moreover, in Jorrat et al. (2018), the participation rule for
police training was the alphabetical order of the officers’ last names. The authors found no
significant differences between the control and treatment groups regarding their socioeconomic
characteristics and participation in violent events. However, this assignation rule is not perfect
because it does not guarantee a balance in unobservable characteristics (for further discussion,
see Deaton, 2010)
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D2 and D4 to participate in the treatment group. Each student was randomly
assigned a different profile (CCTT, TTCC, CTCT or TCTC) to ensure that the
assignation was independent of the student and the contacts’ characteristics.
The assignment procedure is illustrated in Panel B of Figure 1. It is important
to mention that we did not send reminders and we did not use WhatsApp
groups.4
3 The experiment
We ran an experiment to test the internal and external validity of the ran-
domization procedure. The experiment resembles that of the original paper of
Hoffman et al. (1996) on the use of certain words which may trigger pro-social
behavior (see also Bran˜as-Garza, 2007).
The aim of the experiment was to study framing effects in a one-shot PDG.
To do so, we ran one treatment: subjects in the treatment group faced the
PDG with the strategies ”Cooperate” or ”Not cooperate”, while the students
in the control group faced neutral-framed options ”A” or ”B”, where A and
B represent the cooperative and the non-cooperative strategy, respectively.5
These labels may create an experimenter demand effect by providing cues about
what constitutes appropriate behavior (Capraro and Rand, 2018; Zizzo, 2010).
We also examined whether framing has a differential impact on participants
endowed with certain characteristics. In particular, we studied the interaction
between framing and preferences for inequity.
Figure 2 presents the PDG faced by subjects in the control (panel A) and
the treatment (panel B) group. It also shows the payoffs in euros that the
individual would obtain depending on another player’s decision. The experiment
was conducted in two Google Forms: one for the control group and another for
the treatment.
The experimental setup also included: a) informed consent; b) contact num-
4Sending invitations through groups may jeopardize the randomization procedure.
5For more on the instructions, see Section 2 of the Supplementary Information.
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Figure 2: Prisoner’s dilemmas in the decision tree scheme for the control (panel
A) and treatment group (panel B).
ber (to pay if the participant was randomly selected to be paid); c) name of the
student who sent the invitation; d) gender and e) self-reported inequity aver-
sion. The instructions explicitly stated that 10 participants would be randomly
chosen to be paid and that the potential earnings ranged from e0, e1, e5 to
e10.
As mentioned above, we also elicited self-reported solidarity and envy. These
variables refer to people’s aversion to advantageous or disadvantageous inequal-
ity as in the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) (for more details, see Section
B of the Supplementary Information). Using a 10-item Likert scale, we asked
participants if they agreed with the statement “I do not care about how much
money I have; what concerns me is that there are people who have less (more,
for envy) money than I have”. These variables are associated with donations in
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dictator games and cooperation in PDG (Esp´ın et al., 2018, 2019).
In the following section, we test if the entire set of collected variables were
balanced between the control and treatment groups.
4 Results of the randomization procedure
Figure 3 summarizes the results of the recruiting procedure. We invited 1979
contacts using WhatsApp. A total of 1005 contacts received the invitation to the
control group (C) and 974 contacts to the treatment group (T). Although the
distributions between the treatment and the control group were well balanced
(51% in C and 49% in T), not all the invited contacts responded. The response
rate was 37%. In the literature on survey research there is no agreed-upon
standard for a minimum acceptable response rate (Fowler Jr, 2013). However,
our response rate (about 30%) was higher than the average response rate for
online surveys reported in the literature (Millar and Dillman, 2011; Kaplowitz
et al., 2004; Dillman, 2011). Given that the invitation was sent only once (with
no reminders), the procedure proved to work well. This left us with a total of
737 observations, of which 387 were distributed in C (53%) and 350 in T (47%).
The overall attrition rate was 63%. Because we had no information on the
non-respondents’ characteristics, we could not check if the respondents differed
from the non-respondents in each group. However, we checked if the attrition
rates differed between the control and the treatment, and found no evidence of
differential attrition (two-sample test of proportions, p = 0.116).
We also tested whether the control and the treatment were balanced in
terms of observable characteristics. Table 1 provides the results of the mean
comparison tests. We only found that both groups are marginally different
in solidarity and disposition to participate in future experiments. However,
these differences are weakly significant (p > 0.05 in both cases). Therefore, we
conclude that the randomization process worked properly.
To sum up, this procedure allowed us to solve three potential problems in
experiments. First, we obtained nearly 750 responses in just half a day. Second,
8
Figure 3: Randomization results
Table 1: Balance between control and treatment.
Control Treatment T − C p− value
Female 0.447 0.440 -0.007 0.848
Student 0.832 0.840 0.008 0.771
Solidarity 4.778 5.126 0.348* 0.070
Envy 2.948 3.045 0.097 0.558
Future participation 0.553 0.614 0.061* 0.092
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
we ensured independence between the students and the assigned treatments
because they could not change the treatment status and the cut-off in the dif-
fusion groups was exogenous for them. Third, random assignation by diffusion
groups guaranteed a balance in the observable and unobservable factors between
the control and the treatment. Taking all this together, our procedure ensures
internal validity.
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5 Threats to the randomization procedure
In this section, we present the different threats that arose during the implemen-
tation of the experiment.
Duplicates and contamination
One potential problem of this randomization procedure is the presence of du-
plicates, that is, subjects who completed the experiment more than once.6 In
fact, playing twice is very sensible since it doubles the probability of getting
paid. The same subject may also receive an invitation from different students;
a problem that is even more concerning if invitations come from both the control
and the treatment group.
We were able to identify duplicates since we asked subjects to indicate their
telephone number in order to be notified if they were randomly selected to be
paid. Using phone numbers, we identified two types of duplicates: a) subjects
who did the experiment twice but did not change the treatment; and b) those
who did the experiment twice but changed their treatment. This information
is summarized in Table 2. A total of 15 duplicates were identified in each
group. The percentage was 3.9% and 4.3% in C and T, respectively, and the
proportions were not statistically different (two-sample test of proportions, p >
0.3). Regarding the second type, only 2 subjects (0.5%) in the control and 3
in the treatment group (0.9%) changed their treatment status. These subjects
accounted for 0.5% and 0.9% of the total, respectively. Again the proportions
were not statistically different (two-sample test of proportions, p > 0.25).
Table 2: Duplicates in the sample.
Control Treatment
a) Not changing (%) 15 (3.9%) 15 (4.3%)
b) Changing treatment
status (%)
2 (0.5%) 3 (0.9%)
6No one completed the experiment more than twice.
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We decided to keep only the first participation of these subjects. Google
Forms does not provide information about IP, but records the time of the ex-
periment, so it is easy to identify the first response.7
Uninvited subjects
Another potential concern was that subjects could resend the invitations to their
contacts. This problem can lead to an imbalance in the number of observations
in each group, and can also reduce the comparability between the treatment and
the control group. Because participants were also asked to provide the name of
the student who invited them, we were able to identify those subjects who were
invited by another person whose name was not on our list of students.
We had 99 uninvited subjects: 49 in C and 50 in T. This represented an
increase of 14% and 13%, respectively. The proportions in each group are not
statically different (two-sample test of proportions, p > 0.5). Regarding compa-
rability, Table 3 shows that if we add these observations, the differences between
the control and the treatment remain the same. Indeed, the difference for future
participation vanishes. This resulted in a total of 836 different subjects and also
suggests that our procedure is robust to this potential threat.
Table 3: Balance adding subjects invited by an unknown person.
Control Treatment T − C p− value
Female 0.45 0.445 -0.005 0.895
Student 0.839 0.845 0.006 0.826
Solidarity 4.775 5.107 0.332* 0.065
Envy 2.984 3.13 0.146 0.36
Future participation 0.557 0.61 0.053 0.123
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
7In some survey platforms, you can allow only one entry per IP address, that is, two
subjects cannot fill out a survey using the same PC. However, this solution is not available in
Google Forms. Using this tool, you can set a limit of one response if you only allow respondents
to log in to Google, but this excludes subjects without a Google account.
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6 Results
In this section we present the results of our framing experiment. In order to
check the external validity of the procedure, we compare our results with those
found in the literature on framing effects in cooperation. Specifically, we com-
pare the results with those of Capraro and Rand (2018)
It is well known in experimental economics that small changes in the framing
of games (i.e., the way in which the game is described to participants or how
options are presented) can have large effects on players’ choices. The literature
of framing effects on giving in dictator games and PDGs is extensive. When
information regarding the recipient or any other social context is provided, there
is a significant increase in generosity (Hoffman et al., 1996; Bran˜as-Garza, 2007;
Engel, 2011). For cooperation games, the literature is more concise but also
suggests that framing effects are important. Changing the title of the game
(e.g., “Community Game” vs. “Wall Street Game”) increases the cooperation
rate significantly (Liberman et al., 2004). Engel and Rand (2014) found that
the cooperation rate in PDG increases with a cooperative frame compared to
a competitive frame, but the behavior in a neutral frame was not different
than in a cooperative frame. Goerg et al. (2019) also found that ”give versus
take” frames influence subjects’ behavior and beliefs in PDG but not in dictator
games. Lastly, Capraro and Rand (2018) - the experiment that is most similar
to ours - found that prosocial people tend to choose the option that is presented
as being morally right in the given situation, be it equitable or efficient. Their
results support the idea that general morality preferences rather than social
preferences explain cooperation for minimizing social inequities.
In our experiment, we tested whether strategies labeled as ”Cooperate” and
”No cooperate” had an impact on cooperation compared to neutral instructions
(A vs. B). We also tested whether this effect might be explained by individual
social preferences (measured by self-reported solidarity).
Panel A of Figure 4 shows a pronounced treatment effect on choices. Co-
operation becomes more likely when the labels ”Cooperate” or ”Not coop-
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erate” are used compared to neutrally framed strategies (two-sample t test,
p = 0.024).8 Panel B shows that the treatment has heterogeneous effects by sol-
idarity groups.9 For subjects with low solidarity, the effect was not significant
(t test, p > 0.7). However, for those with medium or high solidarity the use
of non-neutral instructions increased cooperation (t test: Medium, p = 0.093;
High, p = 0.017).
Model 1 in Table 4 shows that the use of framing increases cooperative be-
havior by 0.076 points, which represents a 13% increase in cooperation compared
to the control group. Models 2 and 3 show that the estimations are robust to
the inclusion of different controls. Model 4 shows that the interaction between
solidarity and treatment is positive and weakly significant (p = 0.092) and that
the interaction between envy and treatment is not significant.
In sum, we found that framed instructions increase cooperation and that
the treatment effect is higher for subjects with medium and high self-reported
solidarity. This evidence is in line with the results of Andreoni (1995). He
found that people are significantly more willing to cooperate in games when the
problem is posed as a positive externality (i.e., subjects’ choices will benefit the
other subjects). Indeed, our results extend those found by Capraro and Rand
(2018), since part of the framing effect is explained by an individual taste for
solidarity. These results are also in line with those found in Capraro et al. (2020)
for the Stag Hunt Game.
7 Discussion
In lab and online experiments, internal validity requires that: i) the treatment
assignation rule is exogenous; ii) there is no differential attrition; and iii) sub-
jects are unable either to interact with or influence another participant’s deci-
sions (stable unit treatment value assumption or SUTVA). This paper presents
8Note that we use the 737 subjects plus the 99 special cases described in section 5 The
final distribution was 52% in the treatment and 48% in the control group.
9We divided solidarity in 3 categories: low for solidarity lower than 5, medium for solidarity
equal to 5 or 6 and high for solidarity higher than 6.
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Figure 4: Cooperation in control and treatment group. Panel (A) displays
average cooperation by treatment. Panel (B) displays average cooperation by
treatment and solidarity groups. Error bars represent SEM.
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Table 4: OLS estimation of the treatment effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.076** 0.075** 0.077** -0.035
(0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.084)
Student -0.023 -0.021 -0.018
(0.045) (0.045) (0.039)
Female 0.078** 0.070** 0.073**
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Solidarity 0.012* 0.001
(0.006) (0.010)
Envy -0.015** -0.017
(0.007) (0.011)
Treatment ∗ Solidarity 0.022*
(0.013)
Treatment ∗ Envy 0.002
(0.015)
Constant 0.580*** 0.565*** 0.553*** 0.611***
(0.025) (0.049) (0.062) (0.073)
Observations 836 836 836 836
R-squared 0.006 0.013 0.022 0.025
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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an alternative device at almost no cost that can provide a huge number of par-
ticipants and fulfill all the critical requirements regarding power, balance and
attrition. Using WhatsApp, we recruited a large number of subjects in only 12
hours at a negligible cost.10
The invitation and randomization procedure described in Section 2 shows
that we were able to obtain two comparable groups. Both groups were balanced
in two self-reported variables that are related to the alpha and beta parameters
of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and correlated with giving and cooperation (Esp´ın
et al., 2018).
Moreover, we found identical attrition levels in the control and the treatment.
Differential attrition leads to a selection bias if there is unobserved sorting that
could be driving the results. This is an untestable assumption that we need
make in all experiments. Since we obtained the same level of attrition in both
groups, this problem can be considered less important.
However, we found certain threats to internal validity that are magnified in
any online setting. First, we found that some subjects performed the experi-
ment twice. This potential problem could be greater in platforms like Google
Forms because it is not possible to restrict more than one access per IP address.
However, only 4% of the subjects did the experiment twice, and this percent-
age was distributed equally between the control and the treatment group. This
also suggests that the randomization procedure worked properly and assured
between-group comparability.
Second, we found uninvited people who completed the experiment. However,
they were distributed evenly between the treatment and the control and did not
affect the comparability of the groups.
Lastly, the SUTVA assumption requires that any individual’s outcome de-
pends only upon his or her treatment assignment and not upon the treatment
assignment or outcome of any other subject (Rubin, 1974). This potential prob-
lem is a threat in both online and physical laboratories unless the full experiment
10Recruiting from labor markets such as MTurk or Prolific Economics also permits reaching
a large number of subjects.
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is run in one large session. We tried to reduce this problem by running the ex-
periment in a very short time (11 hours) as suggested by Horton et al. (2011).
A remarkable advantage of our experimental procedure was that we reached 300
participants in the first 25 minutes, 400 in 40 minutes and 700 in just one hour.
Regarding external validity, in both online and physical experiments some
degree of self-selection of participation is inevitable. Our results are in line with
the framing effect literature, suggesting that our experiment is informative.
Finally, we should mention that the majority of participants (84%) were
students, which indicates that our procedure is more likely to attract students
than participants who are not students. However, Exadaktylos et al. (2013)
found that self-selected students are an appropriate subject pool for the study
of social behavior.
We therefore consider that our recruiting procedure for online experiments
is a proper avenue for experimental and social research.
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Supplementary Information
Recruiting experimental subjects using WhatsApp
Diego Jorrat
A Design
The front page welcomes the experimental subjects and starts with an introduc-
tion to the prisoner’s dilemma task (see Panel A in Figures). The subjects then
had to click on the acceptance of the informed consent, provide their contact
information and indicate the name of the person who invited them. On the
third page, a decision tree explaining the PD was displayed again and they had
to make the choice (see Panel B in Figures).
Control group
Figure S1 shows the screenshots for the instructions and the decision tree to
answer the PD for the control group. The translated instructions are as follows:
Panel A
Hello
This is an experiment done by students at Loyola University. You are going
to make a decision that can allow you to earn money. At the end of the day we
will randomly choose 5 pairs (10 participants) and pay them the money they
have won. The money is real and is funded by a research project.
The task is very simple: We are going to match you with another person
(neither of you will know who your partner is) and you are going to make a
single decision. The task is to choose ”A” or ”B”.
• If you choose ”A” and your partner chooses ”A”, both will win e5.
• If you choose ”A” and your partner chooses ”B”, you will win e0 and
your partner will win e10.
• If you choose ”B” and your partner chooses ”A”, you will win e10 and
your partner will win e0.
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• If you choose ”B” and your partner chooses ”B”, both will win e1.
You will be person 1. Person 2 will be another participant chosen at random.
You have until 23:59 today to participate. At that time we will close the page.
You will see the answers when we’re done (we will prepare a website with the
answers). Thank you for participating.
Remember: You will not know who your partner is. At the end of the day
there will be a lottery and we will select the 10 winners. We will then contact
the winners to pay them the money (by Bizum or bank transfer).
If for any reason you regret your decision and want to delete your data, send
an email to ULOYOLADE@gmail.com and we will delete your data. If you have
any questions, please write to this email.
Panel B
Your decision
You can choose ”A” or ”B”. If you choose road ”A” and your partner chooses
”A”, both will win e5; but if your partner chooses ”B”, you will win e0 and
your partner will win e10. If you choose road ”B” and your partner chooses
”B”, both will win e1; but if your partner chooses ”A”, you will win e10 and
your partner will get e0.
Treatment group
Figure S2 shows the screenshots of the instructions and the decision tree to
answer the PD for the control group. The translated instructions are as follows:
Panel A
Hello
This is an experiment done by students at Loyola University. You are going
to make a decision that can allow you to earn money. At the end of the day we
will randomly choose 5 pairs (10 participants) and pay them the money they
have won. The money is real and is funded by a research project.
The task is very simple: We are going to match you with another person
(neither of you will know who your partner is) and you are going to make a
single decision. The task is to choose ”Cooperate” or ”Not cooperate”.
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Figure S1: Screenshots of the experimental instructions for the control group.
Panel A shows the instructions and Panel B the decision tree.
• If you choose ”Cooperate” and your partner chooses ”Cooperate”, both
will win e5.
• If you choose ”Cooperate” and your partner chooses ”Not cooperate”, you
will win e0 and your partner will win e10.
• If you choose ”Not cooperate” and your partner chooses ”Cooperate”, you
will win e10 and your partner will win e0.
• If you choose ”Not cooperate” and your partner chooses ”Not cooperate”,
both will win e1.
You will be person 1. Person 2 will be another participant chosen at random.
You have until 23:59 today to participate. At that time we will close the page.
You will see the answers when we’re done (we will prepare a website with the
answers). Thank you for participating.
Remember: You will not know who your partner is. At the end of the day
there will be a lottery and we will select the 10 winners. We will then contact
them to pay them the money (by Bizum or bank transfer).
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If for any reason you regret your decision and want to delete your data, send
an email to ULOYOLADE@gmail.com and we will delete your data. If you have
any questions, please write to this email.
Panel B
Your decision
You can choose ”Cooperate” or ”Not cooperate”. If you choose the road
”Cooperate” and your partner chooses ”Cooperate”, both will win e5; but if
your partner chooses ”Not cooperate”, you will win e0 and your partner will
win e10. If you choose the road ”Not cooperate” and your partner chooses
”Not cooperate”, both will win e1; but if your partner chooses ”Cooperate”,
you will win e10 and your partner will get e0.
Figure S2: Screenshots of the experimental instructions for the treatment group.
Panel A shows the instructions and Panel B the decision tree.
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B Self-reported solidarity and envy
Following Esp´ın et al. (2018), we obtained a self-reported measure of solidarity
and envy. Figure S3 shows the screenshots for both questions.
Solidarity (Top part of Figure S3)
Please use the scale to indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with
the following statement: “I do not care about how much money I have; what
concerns me is that there are people who have less money than I have”. Left:
strongly disagree / Right: strongly agree.
Envy (Bottom part of Figure S3)
Please use the scale to indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with
the following statement: “I do not care about how much money I have; what
concerns me is that there are people who have more money than I have”. Left:
strongly disagree / Right: strongly agree
Figure S3: Screenshots of experimental instructions II. Top: instructions for
Solidarity. Bottom: instructions for Envy.
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